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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING THE TRANSFORMATIVE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
If the constitutional law casebooks are a reliable guide, most teach the
Fourteenth Amendment, like other parts of the Constitution, by presenting
separately the various doctrinal topics it has raised. 1 The principal clauses of the
Amendment, or really those in the second sentence of Section 1 2—the Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses—are generally
extracted from its text and classes are structured around the leading cases
decided under each and the resulting doctrine. Cases under the Equal Protection
or Due Process Clause may be further separated. Based on the class of claimants,
for instance, the cases involving racial and gender equality and affirmative
action may be presented as distinct topics. Further subdivision may group the
cases involving education, employment, and voting, for instance. Sometimes
equal protection and due process both appear, either because claimants raised,
or opinions addressed, each constitutional hook or because an equal protection
claim against the federal government was necessarily brought under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Incorporation receives some, although much
briefer, treatment, casebook page allocation suggests. 3
Some such conceptual approach is common and sensible. It is important for
students to learn something about the history, doctrine, and analytical
approaches regarding the various distinct clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to read the important cases and understand the arguments the Court found
convincing and those it rejected. And it is impossible to begin to understand the
Fourteenth Amendment without studying its principal clauses.

* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS (12th ed. 2013); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2008); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th
ed. 2013); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th ed. 2013).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
3. See, e.g., CHOPER ET AL., supra note 1, at 396–414; REDLICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 380–
85; STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 729–35; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 446–65.
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Yet the danger always exists, in studying constitutional law or anything else,
that paying the necessary attention to the particulars may interfere with grasping
the general, that a focus on specific clauses may hide wider truths, that
examining the trees of constitutional law might obscure the forest. That’s
certainly, and perhaps especially, true of the Fourteenth Amendment. The focus
on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses separately certainly and
appropriately signals their importance as discrete constitutional provisions, yet
unless the lens is pulled back a bit to allow a panoramic view it may not capture
the extraordinary way that the Fourteenth Amendment has transformed the
Constitution.
That would be a huge loss. The Fourteenth Amendment has made the
Constitution much more rights-focused and rights-protective, restructured the
relationship between national and state government, 4 and changed the role and
work of branches of the national government, among other things. And it gave
equality and fairness a more exalted and prominent place in American
constitutional ideals, thereby recognizing and celebrating American pluralism as
among the Constitution’s strengths and intrinsic and enduring commitments.
The transformation occurred largely through the process of incorporation of
rights as against the states and through the development of the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses over time, and these three Fourteenth Amendment
streams together have made the theory and practice of American constitutional
government quite different from what previously existed.
It is certainly not novel to recognize the transformative quality of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing nearly three decades ago, the distinguished
constitutional scholar and federal judge Louis H. Pollak observed that during the
twentieth century, “the scope of the fourteenth amendment has been, and
remains, the most actively controverted complex of constitutional issues,” 5 and
nothing has undermined the truth of Judge Pollak’s judgment in the intervening
years. William Araiza in his masterful study of the Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Clause recently wrote that “it is nearly impossible to exaggerate
the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment. It constitutes the central text of
the second framing of the Constitution, in which federal constitutional rights
were granted to Americans not just as against the federal government but also
against their own states.” 6
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The Civil War
Amendments dramatically altered the relation of the Federal Government to the States.”); see also
ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 192 (2012)
(noting grants of power to Congress but arguing that “the more important shift was along the
dimension of federalism”).
5. Louis H. Pollak, “Original Intention” and the Crucible of Litigation, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
867, 878 (1989).
6. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL
POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–2 (2015); see also BERNARD
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Yet recognition may not lead to classroom communication, especially since
the need to study various clauses and associated doctrine and the pressures of
curriculum coverage may distract from larger themes about constitutional
interpretation and structure implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment. Unless
constitutional law courses consider not simply the individual clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment but the way together they transformed the subject more
generally, the courses may leave students with a distorted view of constitutional
interpretation and an understated sense of the role of that Amendment.
Constitutional amendments come so rarely that all are special but even
within that rarified group the Fourteenth Amendment has had an exceptional
impact. It is a nice coincidence that it occupies the exact midpoint of the twentyseven constitutional amendments. That fortuity regarding its current
constitutional placement symbolizes the pivotal role it plays in the constitutional
structure.
This Essay will begin with some general background in Part I to place the
Fourteenth Amendment in some historical context. Part II will sketch how
incorporation, substantive due process, and the Equal Protection Clause changed
the Constitution in ways that went beyond the doctrine they introduced. Part III
will extract some larger lessons regarding the way in which these doctrines
transformed constitutional interpretation and government more generally which
are worth sharing with students.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Constitution as initially ratified specifically protected relatively few
rights. It was, of course, amended twelve times during roughly the first fifteen
years following its adoption to include, among other provisions, the Bill of
Rights, but these guarantees protected individuals against certain actions by the
national, not by state, government. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in Barron v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, one of Chief Justice John Marshall’s last
opinions, that constitutional clauses which use general language only protect
individual rights as against federal, not state, action. 7 The Constitution only
constrained state action when it so specified, for instance, by enjoining “No state
shall . . .” as it does repeatedly in Article I, Section 10. Accordingly, the preCivil War Constitution protected very few rights, most of which ran as against
the federal government only, and state governments had relatively great latitude

SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835–1877, at
190 (1973) (“From a legal point of view, the changes [from the Civil War Amendments] were
fundamental, for they made for a nationalization of civil rights that was completely to transform
the constitutional system. The protection of life, liberty, and property now became a national
responsibility—federalizing, as it were, the vindication of individual rights throughout the land.”).
7. 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833).
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to regulate except to the extent that state laws conflicted with federal legislation
or state constitutions.
And, of course, most significantly, the Constitution accepted AfricanAmerican slavery, an institution and practice which treated African Americans
as property while denying their equal humanity. The Court gave voice to that
view in the infamous Dred Scott decision. 8
So things remained until the Civil War. That traumatic event was, of course,
a monumental turning point in American history, and not surprisingly the
constitutional structure that emerged after it was quite different from the prior
regime. The aftermath produced new constitutional texts that reflected, allowed,
and inspired changed arrangements. As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it in a
May 1987 speech marking the Constitution’s bicentennial, while “[T]he Union
survived the civil war, the Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more
promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring
protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations
without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.” 9 Whereas
the Bill of Rights had restrained national, not state, government, the three Civil
War amendments imposed restraints on state, and in some cases national,
government. Moreover, each empowered Congress to enforce its terms, a radical
departure from the prior twelve amendments which had explicitly or implicitly
limited Congress.
Yet even among the three Civil War amendments, the Fourteenth
Amendment stands out. The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments each rather
succinctly addressed one specific, although highly significant, subject:
prohibiting slavery and conferring the right of African Americans to vote,
respectively. By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment is striking in the number
of topics covered and its combination of specific problem-solving and
articulation of more abstract concepts.
The Fourteenth Amendment is the wordiest amendment and much of its
length comes in the three middle clauses of the Amendment which now receive
little attention. Section 2 replaced the Three-Fifths Clause in the original
Constitution with a provision that counted blacks as full persons for purposes of
determining representation in the House of Representatives so long as twentyone-year old male citizens were not disenfranchised in federal or state elections
except for participation in rebellion or crime. That provision became necessary
especially, ironically, after the Thirteenth Amendment converted southern
slaves to free persons. That highly-desired outcome, coupled with the possibility
that southern blacks, though free, would be denied the vote, had one potentially

8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
9. Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS,
ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 284 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
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dire consequence. It threatened to give the South a windfall in representatives
and presidential electors without making its electorate more inclusive. Section 2
was designed to obviate that threat by linking increased southern political power
to enfranchisement of African Americans. 10 Section 3 excluded from federal or
state office anyone who had violated an oath to support the Constitution unless
Congress removed the disability. Section 4 guaranteed the national debt and
prohibited Congress from assuming the Confederacy’s debt or compensating
slave owners for the emancipation of slaves.
Although much of the debate regarding the Fourteenth Amendment focused
on these intermediate sections, 11 the Amendment’s first section provided the
new constitutional provisions that transformed constitutional doctrine going
forward. The first sentence of Section 1 contains the Citizenship Clause which
makes U.S. citizenship a function of birth or naturalization and bases state
citizenship simply on the residence decision of a U.S. citizen, thereby
overturning the infamous Dred Scott decision. 12 The second sentence contains
three clauses inhibiting state action abridging the privileges or immunities of
U.S. citizens, or depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or the equal protection of the laws. Section 5 grants Congress
legislative power to enforce the rest of the Amendment, including Section 1.
The Fourteenth Amendment is relatively unique. Unlike most other
amendments, it addresses multiple topics. Unlike the first twelve amendments,
it confers rights as against the states. And especially in the second sentence of
Section 1, it confers rights in language that is more general and more abstract
than is otherwise common.
The trilogy of rights in Section 1’s second sentence might have been viewed
as a package of rights, sort of a belt-and-suspenders approach to ensure that
African Americans would enjoy the benefits of equal treatment going forward. 13
The Privileges or Immunities Clause seems to confer certain unspecified
substantive rights, 14 the Due Process Clause seems to assure procedural
regularity before a person is deprived of something important, and the Equal
Protection Clause seems to guarantee identical treatment at law absent some
appropriate basis for discriminating. 15

10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
11. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, 1835–1877, at 197–98 (1973).
12. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454.
13. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 23–24
(1980).
14. See ARAIZA, supra note 6, at 31 (“Today, many scholars believe that any substantive rights
the drafters intended the amendment bestow were granted by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.”).
15. ELY, supra note 13, at 24.
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That was not, however, the path constitutional doctrine traveled. In the
Slaughter-House Cases 16 in 1872, the Court rendered the Privileges or
Immunities Clause essentially a constitutional nullity. 17 There, white butchers
claimed that a butchering monopoly Louisiana’s state government established
violated their rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to
practice their lawful trade. 18 The plaintiffs’ argument carried the implication that
the Constitution limited state legislative power to encumber their right to
practice their trade (and presumably many other rights), thereby suggesting a
dramatic shift of power from the states by virtue of a new constitutional norm
and the aggrandizement of the Court as constitutional interpreter and Congress
as its enforcer. Justice Miller emphatically rejected 19 the premise that the
Fourteenth Amendment “radically changes the whole theory of the relations of
the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments
to the people.” 20 Writing for a five-justice majority, he interpreted narrowly each
of the three clauses in the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He essentially limited the Equal Protection Clause to claims by

16. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
17. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 (2004); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court all but read the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the
Constitution in the Slaughter-House Cases.”).
18. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 43.
19. Id. at 77–78 (“All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be
sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its discretion
any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in
advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most
ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still
further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve
as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The
argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences
urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case
before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it
radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each
other and of both these governments to the people, the argument has a force that is irresistible, in
the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt. We are
convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments,
nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.”).
20. Id. at 78. For an interesting set of questions regarding Slaughter-House and federalism,
see YOUNG, supra note 4, at 226–27.
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disadvantaged African Americans, 21 apparently viewed the Due Process Clause
as simply affording fair procedures, 22 and held that the sort of claim the butchers
made was not within the limited set the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected against state action. 23
Justice Miller’s narrowing strategies were inconsistent with the history of
the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in limiting
Section 1 to African Americans and confining the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as he did. 24 This Essay is not the occasion to do more than sketch with a
broad brush the subsequent developments with general reference to some of the
constitutional historians whose work provides a closer look. 25 Although the
Court has adhered to a narrow view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it
has rejected Justice Miller’s definitions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses and, in so doing, has allowed the
Amendment to become transformational somewhat in the way the majority
feared in the Slaughter-House Cases.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S STREAMS OF TRANSFORMATION
The expansion of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was
consequential, but the changes did not happen immediately once the Fourteenth
Amendment was added to the Constitution. Nor did they follow in a linear
fashion. The changes occurred through a) the application of rights against state
government which were previously recognized only as existing against the
federal government; b) the growth of the Equal Protection Clause; and c) the
expansion of the Due Process Clause.
A.

Incorporation

Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause seemed the most logical
vehicle to incorporate substantive rights as against the states, 26 the Slaughter-

21. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81 (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race
and that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”).
22. Id. at 80–81.
23. Id. at 73–78.
24. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 163–64 (1988).
25. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 56 (1998); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); NELSON, supra note 24, at 165–200.
26. ELY, supra note 13, at 18, 22–30.
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House Cases were deemed to eliminate that option notwithstanding some
occasional judicial suggestions to the contrary. 27
Yet largely during the twentieth century the Court has, with few exceptions,
made virtually all provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable as against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The process
began in 1897 when the Court effectively held that the Clause applies the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause as against state action 28 and continued most
recently in McDonald v. City of Chicago 29 where the Court held, 5-4, that the
individual Second Amendment right recognized two years earlier, 30 through the
Fourteenth Amendment, limited state and local government. There, only a
plurality thought the Due Process Clause was the vehicle of incorporation and
Justice Thomas relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 31
Incorporation of rights as against the states did not occur immediately or
inexorably. The subject provoked much debate along the way. 32 During the early
twentieth century, the Court applied the Due Process Clause to make the First
Amendment’s protections of speech and press applicable to the states. 33 Justice
Brandeis observed in 1927 in Whitney v. California that “[d]espite arguments to
the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as
well as to matters of procedure. Thus, all fundamental rights comprised within
the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the
States.” 34 The Court confirmed within two decades that the Due Process Clause

27. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“I can
say only that the words ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States’ seem to me an eminently reasonable way of
expressing the idea that, henceforth, the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States.”); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Instead, the right to keep and
bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). Cf. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 n.1 (Black, J.,
concurring) (“My view has been and is that the Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole, makes the Bill
of Rights applicable to the States. This would certainly include the language of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause.”).
28. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
29. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
30. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
31. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806.
32. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 47–125 (1947) (opinions of Reed, Black,
Frankfurter, and Murphy); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 137–40 (1998).
33. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
34. 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).
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incorporated the First Amendment, 35 yet as John Raeburn Green pointed out at
the time, the process was slower in cases dealing with criminal procedure. 36
The Court rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill
of Rights as against the states in Palko v. Connecticut. 37 Ten years later, the
Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination
did not apply as against the states. 38 Writing for the majority, Justice Reed
embraced the conclusion of the Slaughter-House Cases and restated Justice
Miller’s distinction that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from
infringing privileges or immunities of federal, but not state, citizenship, a
dichotomy that safeguards federalism 39 in addition to its other consequences.
Moreover, the majority rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause made the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination applicable as against the states. 40 Adamson, however, triggered a
judicial discussion between the New Deal Justices regarding how to determine
what rights the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against the states and the
appropriate methodology for incorporating those rights. 41 Whereas Justice Black
argued for incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights, Justice Frankfurter argued
that approach undermined state experimentation that could lead to greater
protection of liberty. 42
Yet some of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights regarding criminal
procedure had been selectively applied as against the states by mid-century 43
and the Warren Court embraced and accelerated the project during the 1960s. 44
In all, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment includes and protects
as against state action every right in the first eight amendments except the no
quartering of soldiers protection of the Third Amendment, the grand jury
indictment provision of the Fifth Amendment, the civil trial jury right of the
Seventh Amendment, and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

35. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7–8, 15, 17–18 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). See generally John Raeburn
Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REV.
869 (1948).
36. Raeburn Green, supra note 35, at 876–95.
37. 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
38. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947).
39. Id. at 53 (“It accords with the constitutional doctrine of federalism by leaving to the states
the responsibility of dealing with the privileges and immunities of their citizens except those
inherent in national citizenship. . . . This construction has become embedded in our federal system
as a functioning element in preserving the balance between national and state power.”).
40. Id. at 53–55.
41. See id. at 47–125 (opinions of Reed, Black, Frankfurter, and Murphy).
42. Id. at 67–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. See generally Raeburn Green, supra note 35, at 876–78.
44. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 73–82
(1970).
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Amendment. 45 Writing in 1968, Justice Black noted that through selective
incorporation the Court had almost reached the total incorporation destination
he had prescribed twenty-one years earlier in Adamson, making him a “happy”
Justice regarding the outcome, if not the methodology. 46
Justice Harlan saw less reason for joy. He complained of the near total
incorporation on the centennial of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such extensive
incorporation “put the States in a constitutional straitjacket with respect to their
own development in the administration of criminal or civil law,” he wrote. 47
Justice Harlan thought imposition of a uniform national constitutional norm
interfered with the states’ ability to function as laboratories of democracy. 48
Justice Black dismissed these concerns that incorporation “interferes with our
concept of federalism in that it may prevent States from trying novel social and
economic experiments” since he “never believed that under the guise of
federalism the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded
our citizens through the Bill of Rights.” 49 More recently, Justice Alito, speaking
for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, rejected a
federalism-based argument against incorporating the Second Amendment. He
acknowledged that:
[I]ncorporation of the Second Amendment right will to some extent limit the
legislative freedom of the States, but this is always true when a Bill of Rights
provision is incorporated. Incorporation always restricts experimentation and
local variations, but that has not stopped the Court from incorporating virtually
every other provision of the Bill of Rights. 50

He wrote that under the Court’s precedents, “if a Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels
otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no
means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit
local needs and values.” 51
Incorporation has had an enormous impact. Federal constitutional rights that
once existed only against the national government now apply as against the
states. This new set of rights as against state government covers an area virtually
as broad as the Bill of Rights—speech, press, assembly, religion, gun possession,
police conduct in connection with searches and seizures and interrogation, the
45. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010).
46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (“I am very happy to support this selective
process through which our Court has since the Adamson case held most of the specific Bill of
Rights’ protections applicable to the States to the same extent they are applicable to the Federal
Government.”).
47. Id. at 175–76.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id. at 170.
50. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 784–85.
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criminal justice system, and state and local confiscation, invasion, and regulation
of private property. A wide assortment of state and local conduct is now subject
to federal constitutional norms to be applied by federal, as well as state, jurists.
Space does not allow a full survey of the cases but a better appreciation of
the impact of incorporation may come from taking a brief, closer look at one
area. The incorporation of the religion clauses has subjected public schools to
the requirements of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which have
inhibited activities that would otherwise occur in some jurisdictions. Public
schools cannot, for instance, require a religious objector to salute the flag in
violation of his or her religious beliefs, 52 or present a school-sponsored prayer
whether the prayer is prepared by the school 53 or is a Bible reading, 54 or, at
graduation. 55 They cannot offer a moment of silence for voluntary prayer, 56 or
display religious symbols in the classroom. 57 States are limited regarding the use
of public monies to support religious activity. 58 These decisions are simply a
subset of those relating to public schools. Other cases involving one or both
religion clauses address public display of religious symbols, 59 prayer at the state
legislature and local government meetings, 60 religious belief as a basis for
exemption from employment obligations, 61 and exempting religious
organizations from reporting requirements imposed on other charities. 62 Even
when the Court has upheld challenged behavior, incorporation has made state
and local officials subject to constitutional norms set forth in the Bill of Rights
that formerly applied only to the federal government.
B.

Substantive Due Process

The expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment has also occurred through the
development of the doctrine of substantive due process. John Hart Ely famously
described substantive due process as “a contradiction in terms—sort of like
‘green pastel redness.’” 63 But the oxymoronic quality of substantive due process
has not destroyed its constitutional significance. Perhaps allowance has been
made for the Due Process Clause to do some of the work the Fourteenth

52. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943).
53. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–32, 436 (1962).
54. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
55. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
56. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985).
57. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980).
58. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690, 693 (1994);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
59. County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1989).
60. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
61. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981).
62. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
63. ELY, supra note 13, at 18.
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Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was supposed to do before
Justice Miller sidelined it or, as Richard H. Fallon Jr. suggests, perhaps “some
outcomes . . . are so substantively unfair that no process that produced them
could count as ‘due.’” 64
Although the Court rejected the idea that the Due Process Clause
encompassed plaintiffs’ substantive claims in the Slaughter-House Cases, a few
years later it accepted the idea that the Due Process Clause limited the states’
regulatory power. 65 It embraced the idea that the Clause protected substantive
rights of liberty of contract and property rights at the end of the nineteenth
century. 66 In Lochner v. New York, the Court signaled a willingness to scrutinize
police power legislation to determine whether liberty of contract or property
rights were violated. 67 Only Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. dissented 68 from
the idea that the Clause conferred substantive protection. 69 The jurisprudence of
the Lochner period made the Due Process Clause an instrument whereby the
Court could subject state police power regulations to strict review under the
constitutional norm of liberty of contract. 70 Writing in 1930, Professor Felix
Frankfurter recognized the end of slavery and “the participation of the Negro in
the free life of the nation” as “political changes of stupendous meaning” but
thought “even more important consequences, perhaps, flow from the new
subjection of the states to national control through the effectual veto power
exercised by the Supreme Court over state legislation” thanks to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71 During the first third of the twentieth century the Court used
substantive due process to strike down state (and occasionally federal)
legislation regulating economic matters until it effectively abandoned Lochner
in Nebbia v. New York 72 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 73 during the mid1930s. Nebbia announced a more deferential standard of review 74 and West
Coast Hotel retreated from recognition of liberty of contract as a robust
constitutional right. 75 “The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
64. FALLON, supra note 17, at 81–82.
65. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 134 (1877).
66. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897).
67. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
68. Id. at 74–76.
69. See CUSHMAN, supra note 25, at 56.
70. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
71. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 43 (1930).
72. 291 U.S. 502, 537–38 (1934). See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 25, at 80–83.
73. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
74. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537 (“If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied . . . .”).
75. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391–92 (“What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought,” declared Justice William
O. Douglas for a unanimous Court in 1955. 76
Substantive due process was widely disparaged especially by New Deal
Justices like Black 77 and Douglas. 78 Douglas’s extreme aversion to the doctrine
led to some creative outcomes. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, he excoriated a law
providing for sterilization of certain repeat criminals in language suggestive of
a substantive due process analysis but decided the case instead under the Equal
Protection Clause. 79 Douglas’s resistance to substantive due process made his
penumbras approach more appealing to him in Griswold v. Connecticut80 since
it allowed him to construct an argument more consonant with Justice Black’s
total incorporation approach. He found the right of marital privacy in the
penumbras of various parts of the Bill of Rights, and these were applied as
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 81 Others, however, found the
right of marital privacy a protected Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” interest
without reference to the Bill of Rights. 82 The Court soon embraced substantive
due process more directly, first in Loving v. Virginia 83 as an alternative ground
of decision and then in Roe v. Wade. 84
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils
which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution
is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. This essential
limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in particular.”).
76. Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
77. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728–30 (1963) (rejecting substantive due process).
78. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965) (“[W]e are met with a
wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York, should be our guide. But we
decline that invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.” (citations
omitted)).
79. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race . . . . He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”).
80. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
81. Id. at 484–85; see also id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recognizing, but objecting to,
Justice Douglas’s argument); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 167–68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(accusing Griswold majority of purporting to avoid substantive due process).
82. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 511–16 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing Harlan and White for
accepting substantive due process).
83. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
84. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is . . . .”).
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The Court proceeded to recognize more categories of fundamental rights
protected against state action by the Due Process Clause. In addition to the right
of a married 85 or unmarried couple 86 to use contraceptives, the right to
marriage, 87 and a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, 88 the Court found
rights relating to certain family relationships, 89 and the rights of a same-sex
couple to engage in consensual intimate sexual conduct 90 and to marry. 91
Although some Justices have tried to cabin the reach of the doctrine, 92 it has
most recently been the primary constitutional basis for the Court’s holding
striking down state laws that limit marriage to a man and a woman. 93
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has accordingly provided
a basis for the Court to extend substantive protection to a number of “liberty”
interests without reference to the Bill of Rights. In doing so, various areas once
viewed as within state regulatory power are now subject to federal constitutional
norms. The categories sketched above include some basic areas including
marriage, family life, and sexual behavior. Many of these areas raise
controversial matters and yet local communities must now comply with national
norms and are subject to federal judicial review to police compliance.
C. Equal Protection
The Slaughter-House Cases gave the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due
Process Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause, a narrow definition,
concluding that it was essentially limited to cases challenging state action
adverse to African Americans. 94 Although the Court had occasion to apply the
Clause in nineteenth-century cases alleging race discrimination, 95 toward the
end of the nineteenth century the Court restricted its use by regarding racial
segregation as not a per se violation. 96 When the Court struck down a state

85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
86. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1977).
87. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
89. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
91. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
92. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (stating that the Court
will only recognize new liberty interests if the interest, carefully described, is deeply rooted in the
United States’ history and tradition); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–27 & n.6 (1989)
(examining whether asserted liberty interest is consistent with American traditions after describing
interest at most specific level). But see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (rejecting Glucksberg
approach).
93. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
94. 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).
95. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
96. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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statute prohibiting certain interracial sales of real property among white and
black persons it did so by invoking substantive due process, not equal
protection. 97 In the mid-1920s Holmes derided an argument based on inequality
as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.” 98
Yet a decade later the Court recognized in dicta that courts might need to
scrutinize more carefully statutes discriminating against racial, religious, or
ethnic minorities, especially if they had been subject to past prejudice. 99 That
idea represented an implicit association of the Equal Protection Clause with
pluralism and an acceptance of a judicial responsibility to scrutinize more
closely measures which denied various minorities their equal place in America.
The Court developed more robust doctrine in a common law fashion 100 in cases
brought challenging racial segregation, 101 initially in education 102 and then in
other areas 103 as well.
Brown was a turning point not merely because the Court jettisoned “separate
but equal” in the context of education, but also because it effectively eliminated
the doctrine from other areas, too. In so doing, the Court associated the Equal
Protection Clause with the idea that America should be one community, not two,
and that majorities should be sensitive to the messages their actions send to
minorities. 104 The equal protection norm was so powerful that the Court
unanimously held that the same outcome was required as against the federal
government even though the Constitution states no Equal Protection Clause
applicable to it. 105 “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government,” 106 wrote Chief Justice Warren.
The Warren Court proceeded to implement a more robust equal protection
norm in race discrimination cases by formulating a more rigid approach to
govern classifications adverse to African Americans during the mid-1960s. 107
97. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
98. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
99. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
100. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 85–92 (2012).
101. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 345 (1938).
102. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
103. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (striking down law
criminalizing cohabitation between white and black opposite-sex couples); Anderson v. Martin,
375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964) (striking down state law requiring statement of race of candidate for
political office).
104. See Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 790 (2005).
105. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
106. Id. at 500.
107. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1278 (2007).
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The Court’s declining patience with discriminatory practices against African
Americans was reflected in its rhetoric. Whereas the early Warren Court decided
Brown based on the harmful effect of public school segregation on black
children without specifically criticizing the makers of the laws compelling
separation, 108 the late Warren Court castigated laws forbidding whites and
blacks to marry as impermissible vestiges of White Supremacy in Loving v.
Virginia. 109 During the last sixty or seventy years, the Court has applied the
Equal Protection Clause to address discrimination against African Americans in
a range of contexts formerly within the exclusive purview of state and local
government. 110
Once the Equal Protection Clause developed in cases reviewing state
practices discriminating against African Americans, claimants in other contexts
successfully brought equal protection claims. Cases involving gender
discrimination produced a full set of cases, 111 which introduced a new level of
scrutiny. 112 Cases alleging gender discrimination were brought successfully by
men, 113 as well as women. 114 The Court rejected the propriety of archaic gender
stereotypes that limited economic and leadership opportunities for women. 115
Many of the gender discrimination cases challenged action by the federal
government and thereby provided the Court occasion to further embed an equal
protection component into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 116
Courts interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to regulate other forms of
discrimination including that based on alienage, 117 mental ability, 118 birth
outside of wedlock, 119 and sexual orientation 120 among other categories.

108. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
109. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
110. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964); Brown, 347 U.S. at 483;
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
112. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731; Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
114. See, e.g., Stanton, 421 U.S. at 8; Reed, 404 U.S. at 73.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 643 (1975).
116. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 638
& n.2; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679, 691–92 (1973).
117. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 217–18 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 376 (1971).
118. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
119. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 765–66 (1977).
120. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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More recently, whites have utilized the Equal Protection Clause to challenge
state programs using racial classifications to extend educational, 121
employment, 122 or electoral opportunities 123 to disadvantaged minorities and to
add diversity to public schools 124 and universities. 125 All Justices have viewed
race classifications as requiring some elevated level of scrutiny. 126 Although the
Court has struck down some affirmative action plans, 127 a majority of the
Justices have recognized diversity as a compelling state interest that can
sometimes justify considering race to benefit disadvantaged minorities. 128
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court accordingly scrutinized, and
often struck down, state and local behavior regarding a wide range of
institutions. Indeed, it even became the vehicle by which the Court resolved the
2000 presidential election. 129 The Clause became the provision through which
the Court addressed a range of societal practices that mistreated African
Americans, women, non-citizens, and other minorities based on religious or
sexual identities or practices, national origins, or various other characteristics.
III. THE SUM OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE STREAMS
The Fourteenth Amendment has clearly had a dramatic impact. Even if one
disagrees with particular outcomes and concludes that the Amendment’s
promise has not yet been fully redeemed, it is clear that it has transformed the
Constitution and the way government operates. The impact of incorporation,
substantive due process, and equal protection doctrine has been sweeping, as the
preceding summary suggests. Many constitutional law students probably
underestimate the effect of the Amendment, in part because much of the
incorporated material from the Bill of Rights is generally covered in courses on
criminal procedure, and in part because many of us probably fail to explore the

121. See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 316–17 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51 (2003).
122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476–77, 485–86 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269–70 (1986).
123. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993).
124. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2007).
125. See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–06, 2208; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311–17; Gratz, 539
U.S. at 249–51.
126. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown, 48
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 910–11, 920–24 (2004) (demonstrating that the Justices who addressed the
issue agreed in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz that some form of elevated scrutiny applied to race-based
affirmative action).
127. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
128. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (majority opinion holding that student body diversity is
compelling state interest that can justify use of race); id. at 387, 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that student body diversity can be compelling state interest that can justify use of race but
dissenting on other grounds).
129. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Amendment’s overall effect and its implications with our students. And the
cumulative impact of the Fourteenth Amendment is much greater than, and
different from, the sum of the doctrinal changes in those three areas.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment has proliferated rights as a means to
protect individuals. It tilts the constitutional arrangement from one that relied
heavily on structure to limit government tyranny to one that emphasizes a widely
applicable more capacious set of rights. Some of that shift began with the
addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution but those guarantees initially
only constrained behavior of the national government and accordingly had a
modest impact. The addition of the rights set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment
and their development, and the incorporation of virtually the entire Bill of Rights
as against the states, proliferated the constitutional rights Americans enjoyed as
against government and extended those rights to more people over more
subjects. And whereas interactions with the federal government were relatively
rare, the newly-conferred rights applied as against state and local government,
against the officials and institutions with which people were in regular contact.
The Fourteenth Amendment is, in Bill Araiza’s words, “the primary source for
the constitutional rights Americans enjoy against state misconduct.” 130
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment profoundly changed America’s
constitutional structure. Most constitutional theories include structural argument
as an accepted mode of constitutional interpretation. Arguments based on
federalism, separation of powers, democratic accountability, pluralism, and so
forth are among the Constitution’s foundational concepts even though the
document does not use those words or terms. There is a tendency, however, to
consider constitutional structure in many areas as based exclusively upon the
original Constitution. Such an approach is problematic in failing to consider the
way that constitutional text added by amendment affects the overall structure. It
is particularly problematic when it ignores the transformational impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment in reshaping the meaning of many of these structural
concepts.
Constitutional arguments which extract themes from the Constitution’s
design must consider the structure as it now is, not as initially ratified or even
simply as supplemented by the Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment
imposed constitutional limits on state power and authorized Congress to
legislate to enforce those limits. Shortly after Justice Miller lamented any
sweeping shift of authority from state to federal government, the Court
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment had just such an effect in Ex parte
Virginia, where it upheld a federal indictment against a state judge for excluding
blacks from jury service in violation of federal law. 131 In so doing, it recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment diminished state authority:
130. ARAIZA, supra note 6, at 15.
131. 100 U.S. 339, 340, 347 (1879).
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Nor does it make any difference that such legislation is restrictive of what the
State might have done before the constitutional amendment was adopted. The
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they
are, to a degree, restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is
empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth,
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no
invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States
have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to
enact . . . . But, in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations
which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach
to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise
all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of
rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every
addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding
diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them. 132

Nearly a century and one-half of further development has further shifted the
balance from state to national government. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment has certainly not been the sole driver of that change, it has played
an important part and it has provided textual support for some aspects of the
shift.
To be sure, the Constitution’s structure still envisions an important role for
the states but one which is now heavily constrained in many areas by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment changed the prior balance of power between federal and state
government. 133 It limited the sovereignty of the states by, for instance, allowing
Congress to override the states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 134 Accordingly, Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment added to its arsenal and allowed it to hold states
accountable in ways not permitted under Article I powers.
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment’s significance for the meaning of
federalism, it has important implications for the constitutional roots of pluralism.
It has strengthened and made more visible that commitment. The equal
protection norm commands not simply acceptance but equal treatment of
persons of different races, nationalities, genders, religions, sexual orientations
132. Id. at 346.
133. Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44, 65–66 (1996) (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a
rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the
Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved
by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.”).
134. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not
only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant,
it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.”).
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among other groups, and this commitment to pluralism is reinforced by the
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. The power of the equal protection norm is reflected in the
Supreme Court’s decisions reading equal protection into the Fifth Amendment
to apply as against the federal government, in the cases showing respect for
religious practices of small religious groups, and of the expanding protection for
the rights of gay, lesbian, and transgender persons.
Third, the application of the Bill of Rights to state and local government and
the development of substantive due process and equal protection doctrine have
given litigants much greater opportunity to subject state and local officials and
institutions to federal constitutional review and have presented the Court with
greater opportunity to shape the meaning of those provisions. The pool of
potential cases is no longer limited to those coming from national government.
They now may come from state and local officials and institutions as well.
Fourth, the content of constitutional rights has largely developed in cases
involving behavior of state and local, not national, government. It was, perhaps,
not surprising that the equality norm developed primarily in a state and local
context, 135 since the concept of equal protection is set forth in the Fourteenth
Amendment, not in the Bill of Rights. Yet the leading cases in many areas of the
Bill of Rights and regarding substantive due process have also been cases
involving state or local, not national, action. 136 Think of the school prayer
cases, 137 of Roe v. Wade, 138 of Obergefell, 139 of Miranda. 140 One can easily add
to the list.
Fifth, constitutional norms shaped in cases involving state and local
behavior have also largely defined the constitutional rights against, and duties
of, the federal government. Some of this phenomenon has occurred through
incorporation. 141 Incorporation is an important, though certainly not the
exclusive way that state cases have produced constitutional norms applicable to
the federal government. Although the Court used to note the absence of an Equal

135. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). There are, of course, some exceptions where federal cases have
played a prominent role. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
136. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 290.
137. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
140. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
141. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 290 (“In area after area, incorporation enabled judges first to
invalidate state and local laws—and then, with this doctrinal base thus built up, to begin to keep
Congress in check.”).
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Protection Clause applicable to the federal government, 142 in Bolling v. Sharpe,
the companion to Brown involving segregated schools in Washington, D.C., the
Court stated:
[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of
the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process
of law,” and therefore we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. 143

The Court went on to reason that the decision in Brown compelled the same
result in Bolling even though no Equal Protection Clause limited the federal
government. 144 Over time, the Court has recognized an implicit equal protection
component in the Fifth Amendment. 145 In other contexts, the Court has
announced a congruence principle mandates that equal protection analysis is
identical under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 146 Perhaps this reverse
incorporation is a response to the invitation of the Ninth Amendment. In any
event, it is striking to see rights enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment
against the states now applied equally as against the federal government.
Sixth, the creation of new constitutional norms limiting states promoted
greater uniformity in state conduct regarding individuals. States could still
function as laboratories of democracy as Justice Brandeis envisioned, but not in
ways that interfered with newly recognized rights. To the extent constitutional
norms govern, state and local behavior must be uniform, whether regarding
school population, school prayer, police practice, or marriage, among other
topics.
The incorporation and reverse incorporation jurisprudence involving the
Fourteenth Amendment serve as important reminders of the limits of textual
interpretation. Justice Frankfurter observed in his Adamson concurrence that
“[i]t ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due process of law
meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth,” 147 yet
judicial decisions have produced just that result. The incorporation of various
rights—speech, free exercise, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, takings, and

142. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (“The Fifth
Amendment has no equal protection clause . . . .”).
143. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 500 (“In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”).
145. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
146. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
147. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947).
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so on—through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause meant, in
essence, that the Clause has a different meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment
than in the Fifth since its Fifth Amendment version presumably did not include
the protections that the Bill of Rights stated elsewhere. Similarly, the recognition
of an equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment introduced into the earlier provision content absent from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The point is not that the text has no significance or that it can cavalierly be
disregarded. It is rather that the Fourteenth Amendment experience has indicated
that the Court often will allow other types of constitutional argument to prevail
over textual argument when necessary in view of the consequences or the
morality of the outcomes.
Last, and certainly not least, the Fourteenth Amendment has transformed
America by providing the basis for the creation of a much more just and
inclusive society. One need not agree with every decision issued in its name to
conclude that the Amendment has helped America better achieve its highest
ideals of equality, liberty, and justice through the outcomes its text has allowed
and inspired.
Surely much work remains to be done. The constitutional journey the
Fourteenth Amendment redirected continues. But the transformation that has
occurred is something to applaud this sesquicentennial of the Fourteenth
Amendment. And it is something worth sharing with constitutional law students,
too.

